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Abstract
The actions of intelligent agents, such as chatbots, recommender systems,
and virtual assistants are typically not fully transparent to the user. Con-
sequently, using such an agent involves the user exposing themselves to the
risk that the agent may act in a way opposed to the user’s goals. It is
often argued that people use trust as a cognitive shortcut to reduce the com-
plexity of such interactions. Here we formalise this by using the methods
of evolutionary game theory to study the viability of trust-based strategies
in repeated games. These are reciprocal strategies that cooperate as long
as the other player is observed to be cooperating. Unlike classic reciprocal
strategies, once mutual cooperation has been observed for a threshold num-
ber of rounds they stop checking their co-player’s behaviour every round,
and instead only check with some probability. By doing so, they reduce
the opportunity cost of verifying whether the action of their co-player was
actually cooperative. We demonstrate that these trust-based strategies can
outcompete strategies that are always conditional, such as Tit-for-Tat, when
the opportunity cost is non-negligible. We argue that this cost is likely to
be greater when the interaction is between people and intelligent agents, be-
cause of the reduced transparency of the agent. Consequently, we expect
people to use trust-based strategies more frequently in interactions with in-
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telligent agents. Our results provide new, important insights into the design
of mechanisms for facilitating interactions between humans and intelligent
agents, where trust is an essential factor.
Keywords: Trust, evolutionary game theory, intelligent agents,
cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, repeated games
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence is undoubtedly becoming more integrated into our
every day lives. While much attention has recently been paid to deep machine
learning, intelligent agents that exhibit goal directed behaviour (Wooldridge,
2009) have also come of age. These range from purely software systems such
as videogame characters or chatbots, through to cyberphysical systems such
as smart fridges or autonomous vehicles. We are delegating more and more
aspects of our daily lives to these agents, from the virtual sales agent that
recommends products and services to us on an e-commerce website (Beldad
et al., 2016), to the intelligent virtual assistant (e.g. Amazon Alexa, Apple
Siri, Google Home) that plans our route to work and orders goods and ser-
vices for us on command (Chung et al., 2017). But in all of these cases, the
operation of the agent is not fully transparent to the end user. Although
research in explainable AI is beginning to address these issues (Nunes and
Jannach, 2017), it seems unlikely that a user will ever be able to get complete
information about how and why the agent has taken a particular decision.
Consequently, using such an agent, and accepting its recommendations, nec-
essarily involves the user placing some degree of trust in the agent. In the
broadest sense, trust is willingness to take risk under uncertainty (Luhmann,
1979). Here the risk is that the agent will act in a way opposed to our own
goals, and the uncertainty comes from us lacking complete information about
the behaviour of the agent to be able to ascertain this.
For example, consider again the virtual sales agent operating on the web-
site of an e-commerce company (Chattaraman et al., 2012), which sells prod-
ucts to customers based on the information that it learns about the customer
through a chat dialogue, i.e. an agent-based recommender system (Pu and
Chen, 2007; Yoo et al., 2012; Jugovac and Jannach, 2017). When a customer
interacts with this virtual sales agent it does not have complete information
about why product A from company X is being recommended as opposed
to product B from company Y (Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002). Thus, if the cus-
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tomer is going to use the virtual sales agent, they must take some degree
of risk, for example, that the virtual sales agent recommends more expen-
sive products, or those from manufacturers that the seller has a preferential
relationship with, or does not provide full information about the quality of
the product. Without a full understanding of the virtual sales agent’s source
code, the specifications of the alternative products, and the relationships be-
tween the sellers and manufacturers (Akerlof, 1970; Mahadevan, 2000; Lewis,
2011), some degree of risk and hence trust must be involved (Luhmann, 1979;
Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002). Similarly, when a virtual assistant gives us direc-
tions, we do not have complete information either about the route planning
algorithm that it is using, or about relevant environmental conditions such
as traffic levels. Again, this means that the use of such systems necessarily
involves some degree of risk and hence trust.
This raises the question: how will people behave when interacting with
these kinds of intelligent agents? How will they handle the complexity of the
interaction? Ultimately, this question will need to be answered by empirical
work. However, to guide the empirical work it is necessary to generate hy-
potheses about how we expect people to behave. Because intelligent agents
exhibit goal directed behaviour, and their goals (as programmed by their
designers) may be in conflict with the goals of their users, evolutionary game
theory (EGT) (Maynard Smith, 1982; Sigmund, 2010) provides a suitable
formal framework for modelling the strategic interaction and understanding
behavioural dynamics (Shoham, 2008). This is because not only is the inter-
action strategic, but there is empirical evidence that people use a standard
set of social scripts whether they are interacting with a person or a machine in
a particular social situation (Nass and Moon, 2000). This suggests that pre-
dictions from game theoretical studies about human behaviour in traditional
(e-)commerce, for example (e.g. Laaksonen et al. 2009; Dahlstrom et al.
2014), can also be useful when the interaction is between a human and an
intelligent agent representing another entity (individual, firm, organisation),
rather than with that entity directly.
In light of this, we propose that the types of interaction discussed above
can be modelled as repeated games between the user and the agent (acting
to fulfil the goals of its designer). Moreover, in important cases the actions
available to the agent and the user correspond to “cooperate” and “defect”.
Cooperation between players represents both the user and agent behaving
honestly, reliably and transparently with each other. For example, coopera-
tion would be a virtual sales agent selling products that match the preferences
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that the user has revealed in the conversation, while defection might corre-
spond to trying to upsell products or warranties. On the side of the user,
cooperation could represent continued use of the agent, which benefits the
seller by reducing their opportunity costs of answering customer enquiries
themselves. Defection would then represent refusing to use the agent and
instead speaking directly to a human sales advisor.
The folk theorem of repeated games tells us that the key to cooperative
outcomes, which benefit both sides, is sufficient information for the play-
ers to be able to condition their actions on the past actions of the other
player(s) (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). This allows for reciprocal strate-
gies, e.g. cooperate if the other player cooperated in the previous interaction,
as exemplified by the Tit-for-Tat strategy (Axelrod, 1984). However, the use
of reciprocal strategies necessarily carries an opportunity cost. Part of this
comes from devoting cognitive resources to remembering a history of past
actions, and processing this when deciding how to act. But in addition to
this, reciprocal strategies also involve verifying whether the observed action
of the other player actually was cooperative or not. In traditional face-to-face
interactions between humans verifying whether the other player cooperated
might involve, for example, checking the quality and specification of goods
that have been purchased, or that the correct amount of change has been
given. However, these costs are usually assumed to be low compared to the
benefit and cost of cooperation (Ho, 1996; Imhof et al., 2005a; Han, 2013),
and are mostly omitted in (evolutionary) game theoretic models (McNally
et al., 2012; Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2015; Garcia and van Veelen, 2018;
Hilbe et al., 2017). But the move to interactions over the internet increases
these costs (Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002), since the increased separation in space
and time over the course of the interaction makes verifying the action of the
other player more costly. The move to interacting with intelligent agents
increases these costs even more, since the interaction becomes less transpar-
ent to the user, and artificial agents have limited capacity to explain their
action compared to humans. This issue is increasingly more relevant when
considering hybrid societies of humans and intelligent agents (Paiva et al.,
2018; Santos et al., 2019).
It is often argued that humans use trust as a cognitive shortcut, to reduce
the complexity of the interaction that they need to reason about (Luhmann,
1979; Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002; Petruzzi et al., 2014). In this paper, we for-
malise this in EGT by introducing trust-based strategies in repeated games,
and study their evolutionary viability when competing with other strategies
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in repeated games, in a similar fashion to Imhof et al. (2005a). Unlike tra-
ditional Tit-for-Tat, trust-based strategies only check a co-player’s actions
occasionally after a trust threshold has been reached, i.e. after their co-
player has cooperated for a certain number of rounds. By doing so, they
reduce the opportunity cost of verifying the action of their co-player every
round. We demonstrate that trust-based strategies can be more successful
than Tit-for-Tat when the opportunity cost of using a conditional strategy
is non-negligible. Moreover, one may ask under what kinds of interaction
or business at hand are trust-based strategies more likely to be used by the
parties involved? For instance, will users trust in a chatbot to handle highly
important interactions such as a multi-million dollars transition? We show
that trust-based strategies are most successful when the interaction is of in-
termediate importance, and the interaction is repeated over many rounds.
These results provide game theoretic support for the theory that humans use
trust to reduce the complexity of interactions, and suggest that people are
likely to behave even more in this manner when interactions are with intelli-
gent agents, since the opportunity costs of verifying the actions of intelligent
agents are likely to be greater.
2. Models and Methods
2.1. Models
We consider a population of constant size N . At each time step or gen-
eration, a random pair of players are chosen to play with each other.
2.2. Interaction between Individuals
Interactions are modelled as a symmetric two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, defined by the following payoff matrix (for row player)
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
.
A player who chooses to cooperate (C) with someone who defects (D) receives
the sucker’s payoff S, whereas the defecting player gains the temptation to
defect, T . Mutual cooperation (resp., defection) yields the reward R (resp.,
punishment P) for both players. Depending on the ordering of these four
payoffs, different social dilemmas arise (Macy and Flache, 2002; Santos et al.,
5
2006). Namely, in this work we are concerned with the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), where T > R > P > S. In a single round, it is always best to defect,
but cooperation may be rewarded if the game is repeated. In repeated PD, it
is also required that mutual cooperation is preferred over an equal probability
of unilateral cooperation and defection (2R > T + S); otherwise alternating
between cooperation and defection would lead to a higher payoff than mutual
cooperation. For convenience and a clear representation of results, we later
mostly use the Donation game (Sigmund, 2010)—a famous special case of
the PD—where T = b, R = b− c, P = 0, S = −c, satisfying that b > c > 0,
where b and c stand respectively for “benefit” and “cost” (of cooperation).
In addition, in order to understand how the duration of the interaction or
business at hand impacts the evolutionary viability of trust-based strategies
in relation to others, we model how important or beneficial an interaction is
using parameter γ > 0 (Han et al., 2013). Hence, the payoff matrix becomes
( C D
C γR γS
D γT γP
)
.
In a population of N individuals interacting via a repeated (or iterated)
Prisoner’s dilemma, whenever two specific strategies are present in the pop-
ulation, say A and B, the fitness of an individual with a strategy A in a
population with k As and (N − k) Bs can be written as
ΠA(k) =
1
r(N − 1)
r∑
j=1
[(k − 1)piA,A(j) + (N − k)piA,B(j)], (1)
where piA,A(j) (piA,B(j)) stands for the payoff obtained from a round j as
a result of their mutual behavior of an A strategist in an interaction with
a A (B) strategist (as specified by the payoff matrix above), and r is the
total number of rounds of the Prisoner’s dilemma. As usual, instead of
considering a fixed number of rounds, upon completion of each round, there is
a probability w that yet another round of the game will take place, resulting
in an average number of r = (1 − w)−1 rounds per interaction (Sigmund,
2010). In the following, all values of Π will be computed analytically.
2.3. Strategies in IPD and the opportunity cost
The repeated (or iterated) PD is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat
(TFT), which won both Axelrod’s tournaments (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and
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Hamilton, 1981). TFT starts by cooperating, and does whatever the oppo-
nent did in the previous round. It will cooperate if the opponent cooperated,
and will defect if the opponent defected.
As a conditional strategy, TFT incurs an additional opportunity cost,
denoted by , compared to the unconditional strategies, namely, ALLC (al-
ways cooperate) and ALLD (always defect). This cost involves a cognitive
cost (to memorise previous interaction outcomes with co-players and make a
decision based on them) and moreover, a cost of revealing the actual actions
of co-players (cf. Introduction). The latter cost is usually ignored in previous
works of IPD, but it can be non-trivial and thus significantly influence the
nature of interactions. For instance, this cost is crucial to be considered in
the context of human-machine interactions. For example, it might be quite
costly and time consuming to check if one was charged the right amount
when pay online/by Card/on ATM/ and whether the quality of the coffee
produced by your coffee machine is reducing (and to what extent). This cost
is even greater when interacting with intelligent agents whose operation and
hence goals are less transparent, and which might, for example, be designed
to hide pertinent information from users.
Trust-based strategies
We consider a new trust-based strategy that is capable of switching off the
costly deliberation process when it trusts its co-players enough 1. Namely,
this strategy starts an IPD interaction as a TFT player. When its ongoing
trust level towards the co-player—defined here as the difference between the
number of cooperative and defective moves from the co-player so far in the
IPD—reaches a certain threshold, denoted by θ, it will play C uncondition-
ally. We denote this strategy by TUC. TUC is illustrated in the Figure 1
representing one game between TUC and TFT.
Given the possibility of being exploited, but still to avoid costly deliber-
ation, we assume that TUC will check, with a probability p, the co-player’s
actions after switching off 2. If the co-player is found out to defect, TUC will
1Our modelling approach is in accordance with the definition of trust adopted in various
multi-agent research, e.g. (Dasgupta, 2000; Ramchurn et al., 2004). That is, trust is
a belief an agent has that the other party will do what it says it will (being honest
and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocal for the common good of both), given an
opportunity to defect to get higher payoffs.
2We assume that, given a sufficient cost of checking, TUC can always correctly find
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Figure 1: Diagram representing repeated interactions between a trust-based cooperator
TUC and a tit-for-tat TFT. First, both strategies cooperate and check other player’s
action. After θ rounds (here θ = 3), trust is reached and TUC now checks the action
of TFT occasionally with a probability p. Because TFT continues to cooperate, TUC
continues to trust and to cooperate.
revert to its initial strategy, i.e. TFT. As a counterpart of TUC, we consider
TUD that whenever the ongoing trust level reaches the threshold θ, switches
to playing D unconditionally. TUD is illustrated in the Figure 2 representing
one game between TUC and TUD.
The payoff matrix for the five strategies ALLC, ALLD, TFT, TUC and
TUD, can be given as follows

AllC AllD TFT TUC TUD
AllC R S R R θR+(r−θ)Sr
AllD T P T+(r−1)Pr
T+(r−1)P
r
T+(r−1)P
r
TFT R− ε S+(r−1)Pr − ε R− ε R− ε θR+S+(r−θ−1)Pr − ε
TUC R− θεr − p(r−θ)εr S+(r−1)Pr − ε R− θεr − p(r−θ)εr R− θεr − p(r−θ)εr ΠTUC,TUD
TUD θR+(r−θ)T−θεr
S+(r−1)P
r − ε θR+T+(r−θ−1)P−θεr ΠTUD,TUC θR+(r−θ)P−θεr

(2)
For clarity, we write the payoff of TUC against TUD and TUD against
out the co-player’s actions.
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Figure 2: Diagram representing repeated interactions between a trust-based cooperator
TUC and a trust-based defector TUD. First, both strategies cooperate and check the other
player’s action. After θ rounds (here θ = 3), trust is reached for both strategies. TUC
now cooperates and TUD defects. This continues until TUC checks and realises that TUD
defects. After that, TUC looses trust, plays as a TFT and defects.
TUC separately. Namely, the payoff of TUC against TUD is given by
ΠTUC,TUD =
1
r
(θR− θε+ S + p(r′ − 1)(P − ) + (1− p)(S + p(r′ − 2)(P − ) + (1− p)[....]))
=
1
r
(
θR− θε+ S
r′−1∑
i=0
(1− p)i + p(P − )
r′−1∑
i=0
(r′ − i− 1)(1− p)i
)
=
θR− θε
r
+
1
r
(
S(1− (1− p)r−θ)
p
+
(P − ε)((1− p)r−θ + (r − θ)p− 1))
p
)
where r′ = r − θ. Similarly,
ΠTUD,TUC =
θR− θε
r
+
1
r
(
T (1− (1− p)r−θ
p
+
P ((1− p)r−θ + (r − θ)p− 1)
p
)
The payoff formulas can be explained as follows. In the first θ rounds both
TUC and TUD play C and keep checking, so they obtain in each round R−.
As trust is reached, from next rounds TUC will check only occasionally with
probability p. For example, if in the next round TUC checks, it obtains S
in that round and P −  in the remaining rounds since it will play TFT.
Otherwise, i.e. if TUC does not check in that round (with probability 1−p),
the process above is iterated for the payoffs calculation.
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2.4. Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
We resort in this paper to Evolutionary Game Theory methods for finite
populations understanding evolutionary dynamics of trust-based behaviours,
in relation to other strategies (Imhof et al., 2005b). In this context, agents’
payoff represents their fitness or social success, and evolutionary dynamics
is shaped by social learning (Sigmund, 2010), assuming that more successful
agents will tend to be imitated more often by the others. We adapt here
the pairwise comparison rule (Traulsen et al., 2006) to model social learning,
where an agent A with fitness fA adopts the strategy of another agent B
with fitness fB with probability given by the Fermi function,
PA→B =
(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1
.
The parameter β stands for the imitation strength or intensity of selection,
i.e., how strongly agents base their decision to imitate on fitness comparison,
where with β = 0, the imitation decision is random, while for increasing β,
imitation becomes increasingly deterministic.
In the absence of behavioural exploration or mutations, end states of
evolution inevitably are monomorphic. That is, whenever such a state is
reached, it cannot be escaped via imitation. Thus, we further assume that,
with some mutation probability, an agent can freely explore its behavioural
space. In the limit of small mutation rates, the behavioural dynamics can
be conveniently described by a Markov Chain, where each state represents a
monomorphic population, whereas the transition probabilities are given by
the fixation probability of a single mutant. The resulting Markov Chain has a
stationary distribution, which characterises the average time the population
spends in each of these monomorphic end states.
Suppose there exist at most two strategies in the population, say, k agents
using strategy A (0 ≤ k ≤ N) and (N − k) agents using strategies B. Let
us denote by piX,Y the payoff an agent using strategy X obtained in an
interaction with another individual using strategy Y (as given in the payoff
matrix (2)). Hence, the (average) payoff of the agent that uses A and B can
be written as follows, respectively,
ΠA(k) =
(k − 1)piA,A + (N − k)piA,B
N − 1 ,
ΠB(k) =
kpiB,A + (N − k − 1)piB,B
N − 1 ,
(3)
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Now, the probability to change the number k of agents using strategy A
by ± one in each time step can be written as (Traulsen et al., 2006)
T±(k) =
N − k
N
k
N
[
1 + e∓β[ΠA(k)−ΠB(k)]
]−1
. (4)
The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy A in a population
of (N−1) agents using B is given by (Traulsen et al., 2006; Karlin and Taylor,
1975; Imhof et al., 2005b)
ρB,A =
(
1 +
N−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
)−1
. (5)
When considering a set {1, ..., s} of distinct strategies, these fixation proba-
bilities determine the Markov Chain transition matrix M = {Tij}si,j=1, with
Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(s − 1) and Tii = 1 −
∑s
j=1,j 6=i Tij. The normalised eigenvec-
tor of the transposed of M associated with the eigenvalue 1 provides the
above described stationary distribution (Imhof et al., 2005b), which defines
the relative time the population spends while adopting each of the strategies.
3. Results
We use the model defined above to answer two questions. First, when
will individuals use trust? To answer this question, we investigate under
which conditions trust is an evolutionary viable strategy. We measure the
success of trust by the frequency of the trust-based cooperative strategy
(TUC), i.e the proportion of time the population is composed of only TUC.
Second, when should there be trust, in terms of how well the prevalence of
trust-based behaviour enhances cooperation outcomes? We investigate the
second question by looking under which conditions the presence of trust-
based strategies (both TUC and TUD) increase the frequency of cooperation
in the population.
The default values of the parameters, unless otherwise specified, are for
the game payoffs R = 1, S = −1, T = 2, P = 0 (i.e. b = 2 and c = 1 in
Donation game), the importance of the game γ = 1, the number of rounds
r = 50, the population size N = 100, the intensity of selection β = 0.1, the
trust threshold θ = 3, the probability of checking its partner p = 0.25 and the
opportunity cost  = 0.25. The analysis of the model has been implemented
using the package EGTTools (Ferna´ndez Domingos, 2020).
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Figure 3: Left: Frequency of strategies as a function of the opportunity cost
. Right: Frequency of cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based
strategies TUC and TUD, as a function of the opportunity cost . The difference
in frequency of cooperation between the two scenario is shaded in green when positive and
red when negative.
3.1. Trust as a mechanism to reduce opportunity costs
The intuitive benefit of trusting something is to limit the cost of moni-
toring their actions in a long-term interaction, providing a shortcut in the
decision making process. This is in line with several common definitions and
theories of trust (Luhmann, 1979; Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002; Petruzzi et al.,
2014). Thus, we explore first the effect of opportunity cost  on the strategies
employed by individuals and the resulting frequency of cooperation.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows that TUC is the most common strategy
for a low to intermediate opportunity cost  (between 0 and 0.3). When the
opportunity cost  is zero, both TUC and TFT are successful strategies and
the population is composed of either one of them for most of the time. The
success of TUC and TFT is explained by the capacity of these strategies to
maintain high levels of cooperation within their homogeneous populations,
while avoiding exploitation by AllD. Yet, the success of TFT is limited by
the opportunity cost paid to check its partner’s actions. This is shown in the
results by the population being mostly AllD when the opportunity cost  is
high. Compared to TFT, TUC can limit this opportunity cost by reducing
its attention to its partner’s actions once trust is reached. This is why as
the opportunity cost increases, the frequency of TFT plummets while TUC
becomes more commonly observed.
The right panel of Figure 3 shows that the presence of trust-based strate-
gies increases the frequency of cooperation. Importantly, this increase hap-
pens even when the opportunity cost  is high ( ≈ c), and not only when
12
r = 20 r = 50 r = 100
0.1 1 10 100 1000 0.1 1 10 100 1000 0.1 1 10 100 1000
0.25
0.50
0.75
Importance of the game γ
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y Frequency ofstrategy
AllC
AllD
TFT
TUC
TUD
r = 20 r = 50 r = 100
0.1 1 10 100 1000 0.1 1 10 100 1000 0.1 1 10 100 1000
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Importance of the game γ
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Frequency of
cooperation
without TUC/TUD
with TUC/TUD
Figure 4: Top: Frequency of strategies as a function of the number of rounds
r and importance of the game γ (logarithmic scale); Bottom: Frequency of
cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based strategies TUC and TUD, as
a function of the number of rounds r and importance of the game γ (logarithmic
scale). For clarity, the difference in frequency of cooperation is shaded in green when
positive and red when negative.
TUC is the most frequent, e.g. for low . This is because a high frequency of
cooperation is already reached for a low opportunity cost due to TFT. The
presence of TUC has a more important effect on cooperation when the oppor-
tunity cost increases since in that case the performance of TFT significantly
reduces.
To conclude, trust-based cooperation is a particularly common strategy,
in particular in interactions with moderate opportunity cost, and it promotes
cooperation for a large range of opportunity costs.
3.2. Length of interactions and importance of the game
We now investigate (i) the importance of the game γ because this affects
the relative cost of checking the other player and (ii) the number of rounds,
because this affects the relative time that is required for trust to be estab-
lished. The results are presented in Figure 4. First, we discuss the cases on
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the left column, where repeated interactions are short (expected number of
rounds r = 20). The top left panel of Figure 4 shows that in such condi-
tions, TUC is successful for medium importance of the game. TUC is also
the most frequent strategy for a large range of importance of the game (note
that the results presented are on a logarithmic scale). When the importance
of the game is very low e.g. γ = 0.1, the most frequent strategy is AllD. In
this condition, the opportunity cost is too high relative to the benefit pro-
vided by cooperation for either of the conditionally cooperative strategies,
TUC or TFT, to thrive. When the importance of the game is very high,
e.g. γ = 1000, TUC is almost never observed and TUD is, by far, the most
frequent strategy. When the importance of game is high, defecting while the
other player cooperates provides a huge benefit. AllD gets this benefit on the
first round played with AllC, TFT and TUC. On the other hand, TUD ob-
tains this advantageous payoff at least on the round after trust is established
when interacting with TUC and TFT. This advantage by TUD is hard to
recover through reciprocity if the number of rounds is not sufficiently high.
This result is dependent of the length of the interactions. The top part
of Figure 4 shows that a higher number of rounds r leads to (i) a higher
frequency of TUC and (ii) the prevalence of TUC for a wider range of im-
portance of game γ. TUC remains the most frequent strategy even when
the importance of the game is high if the interactions are sufficiently long.
This is because the high number of rounds where both individuals cooperate
make up for the few initial rounds where TUC is exploited by TUD (and on
a lesser extent, AllD).
The bottom part of Figure 4 shows that the presence of trust-based strate-
gies increases the frequency of cooperation for all conditions examined. The
highest frequency of cooperation is obtained for long interactions and high
importance of the game. As shown by the similar shape of the curves, the
higher frequency of cooperation appears to result from the high frequency
of TUC. There is one notable exception. As shown in the bottom left figure
(low r and high γ), the presence of trust based strategies also increases coop-
eration when TUC is not present. This is because TUD strategies cooperate
more (for θ rounds) than AllD strategies which never cooperate.
In conclusion, trust is favoured for long-term interactions and can be
observed on a wide range of importance of the game. The presence of trust-
based strategies increases the frequency of cooperation for the whole set of
parameter values studied.
14
ε = 0 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.5
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Trustfulness 1 p
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y AllC
AllD
TFT
TUC
TUD
ε = 0 ε = 0.2 ε = 0.5
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Trustfulness 1 p
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Frequency of
cooperation
without TUC/TUD
with TUC/TUD
Figure 5: Top: Frequency of strategies as a function of the opportunity cost 
and trustfulness 1/p (average number of rounds between checking event). Bot-
tom: Frequency of cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based strategies
TUC and TUD, as a function of the opportunity cost  and trustfulness 1/p
(average number of rounds between checking event). For clarity, the difference in
frequency of cooperation is shaded in green when positive and red when negative.
3.3. Trustfulness and TUD
We have seen from the above results that trust-based cooperators are
vulnerable to exploitation by TUD players, which are specifically tailored to
take advantage of unconditional trust. This vulnerability was limited so far
as we considered a rather careful truster with a p = 0.25. We now look at
what is the effect of the probability of checking p on the success of TUC and
the frequency of cooperation. For clarity, we present the result as a function
of 1/p, which approximates the trustfulness (which is larger for a smaller
probability of checking) of TUC on the overall game, rather than p, which
represents the carefulness of TUC on a single round.
The top part of Figure 5 first confirms that it is important for TUC’s
success to continue checking after trust is reached as TUC is much less fre-
quent for a high value of trustfulness (i.e high 1/p). If TUC is too trustful,
the game is either dominated by TFT when the opportunity cost is small, by
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TUD when the opportunity cost is intermediate, and and AllD when the op-
portunity cost is high. There is an intermediate optimal trustfulness 1/p at
which TUC is the most frequent strategy (except for zero opportunity costs
where the lowest trustfulness and the highest probability of checking is the
best strategy, which is equivalent to TFT). On the one hand, low trustful-
ness makes TUC less successful because TUC checks its partner often and so
pays a higher opportunity cost. On the other hand, high trustfulness makes
TUC vulnerable to exploitation by TUD for a longer number of rounds. The
results show that there can be an optimal level of trust resulting from this
trade-off.
The bottom part of Figure 5 shows that the presence of trust-based strate-
gies increases the frequency of cooperation when the opportunity cost is mod-
erate or high. This cooperation improvement is the highest for the optimal
trustfulness at which TUC is very frequent. Again, the presence of trust-
based strategies can lead to an increase in the frequency of cooperation even
if they are not the most frequent strategy e.g. for very high opportunity costs
. Unlike previously, the results also show that the presence of trust-based
strategies can reduce the frequency of cooperation. This happens when the
opportunity cost  is low and the trustfulness 1/p is high. In these con-
ditions, trustful and careless TUC players get exploited by TUD players,
which increases the frequency of TUD, making cooperation a less viable op-
tion (evolutionarily). In the absence of trust-based strategies, TFT is careful
enough to avoid this pitfall.
To conclude, unconditional trust is a viable strategy only in limited con-
ditions and how much TUC relies on trust can have significant effect on the
success of the strategy.
4. Discussion
Trust is a commonly observed mechanism in human interactions, and dis-
cussions on the role of trust are being extended to social interactions between
humans and intelligent machines (Andras et al., 2018). It is therefore impor-
tant to understand how people behave when interacting with those machines;
particularly, whether and when they might exhibit trust behaviour towards
them? Answering these questions is crucial for providing suitable designs
of mechanisms or infrastructures to facilitate human-intelligent machine in-
teractions, e.g. in engineering pro-sociality in a hybrid society of humans
and machines (Paiva et al., 2018). To this end, this paper provides a game
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theoretic analysis, where we formalised trust as a behavioural strategy and
integrated it into an EGT model to study (i) its success in competition with
non-trusting strategies and (ii) its effect on the level of cooperation.
Our results show first that trust is expected to be a pervasive cooperation
enabling strategy. It is a frequent strategy for a large range of parameters,
even in the presence of other strategies that are traditionally successful such
as unconditional defection and Tit-for-Tat. Second, our results show that
trust is a desirable mechanism in social systems because the presence of
trust-based strategies increases the level of cooperation for a wide range of
parameters. Finally, we show that trust-based cooperators are vulnerable to
trust-based defectors, which are specialised to exploit them. However, our
results also suggest that a minimum carefulness after trust is reached (low
p) strongly limits this vulnerability.
Overall, our analysis shows that trust can emerge because it reduces the
opportunity costs paid by individuals during interactions. It is a form of
cognitive shortcut that, while exposing the player to some risks, can allow
individuals to cooperate at lesser cost. If the pitfalls of trust have often been
discussed, our results underlie the importance of taking into account both
the benefits and the risk that the use of trust involves. Understanding the
balance between these two is a first step to optimise the benefits of trust in
intelligent machines while limiting the costs. On this line, further work could
expand the model to look at different forms of trust based cooperation and
defection strategies, how they co-evolve, and how exploitation of trust-based
cooperators can be avoided. It is noteworthy that our additional (numerical)
analyses have shown that all the observations described above (i.e. in Figures
3 - 5) are robust, e.g. for different values of the threshold number of rounds
required for trust to be established (i.e. θ) (see Appendix). Moreover, note
that in the current model we consider that TUC and TUD have the same
θ, which is the worst case scenario for the evolution of TUC (and cooper-
ation), since it represents the situation where TUD can perfectly recognise
when TUC starts trusting a cooperative co-player and therefore becomes less
vigilant of exploitation. More realistically, TUD might need to spend extra
resource to gather information about TUC (e.g. providers learn about their
customers’ preferences and behaviours) to determine what is TUC’s θ. On
the other hand, TUC should not easily reveal or make available their infor-
mation (that can be used to infer their θ), to better deal with TUD. Future
work should address how these aspects might change the outcome of the
evolutionary dynamics.
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One of the most famous previous formalisations of trust is an experiment
from behavioural economics called the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). This
game consists of one individual receiving an endowment of money, of which
it must choose a certain amount (which can be zero) to send to the other
player. The amount sent to the other player is tripled by the experimenter (so
that sending money represents an investment). The other player then decides
what amount of this money (if any) to send back to the first player (so that
there is risk in the first player sending money). While the Nash equilibrium
is for the first player to send nothing to the other player, in experiments in-
dividuals usually deviate from this by sending a positive amount (Berg et al.,
1995). The amount that the first player sends can be understood as mea-
suring how much the first player trusts the second to reciprocate. However,
in contrast to our formalisation, the trust game measures more a willingness
to take risks blindly, as interactions are between anonymous individuals and
are played only once. By contrast, we have considered repeated interactions
between the same individuals, which has enabled us to look at the success of
strategies that build up trust over time.
In line with our approach, trust enabling strategies were previously con-
sidered in the context of repeated games (Han et al., 2011), where trust is
built over time as a component of a larger decision making process, for pre-
diction of opponents’ behaviour. Trust was also considered for enabling co-
operation in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (Janssen, 2008; McNamara et al.,
2009), but it was assumed that players can recognise how trustworthy a co-
player is based on additional cues such as signalling. Our work differs from
these approaches in that we consider trust as a cognitive shortcut to avoid
deliberation and having to check the outcomes of previous interaction(s),
thereby limiting the opportunity cost of conditional strategies.
In addition, trust has been used extensively in various computerised sys-
tems, such as in multi-agent open and distributed systems, for facilitating
agents’ interactions. Agents may have limited computational and storage
capabilities that restrict their control over interactions, and trust is used
to minimise uncertainty associated with the interactions, especially when
agents inhabit in uncertain and constantly changing environments (Ram-
churn et al., 2004; Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2001). This is the case for vari-
ous applications including peer-to-peer computing, smart-grids, e-commerce,
etc (Kamhoua et al., 2011; Ramchurn et al., 2004; Papadopoulou et al., 2001;
Petruzzi et al., 2014; Brooks et al., 2020). These studies utilise trust for the
purpose of regulating individual and collective behaviours, formalising dif-
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ferent aspects of trust (such as reputation and belief) (Castelfranchi, 1997;
Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Our results and approach provide novel
insights into the design of such computerised and hybrid systems as these
require trust to ensure high levels of cooperation or efficient collaboration
within a group or team of agents, including human-machine hybrid interac-
tions. For instance, our results show that the importance of the business
at hand (relative to the opportunity cost) needs to be taken into account
to ensure a desired level of cooperation. Also, the system needs to be de-
signed so that the opportunity cost of verifying the actions of an intelligent
machine is sufficiently low (relative to the benefit and cost of the game) to
enable a long-term trusting relationship with customers, e.g. making the
activities transparent either directly to the user or to expert auditors that
follow professional codes of ethics (Andras et al., 2018).
In the current work we have focused on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as it
represents the hardest (pairwise) scenario for cooperation to emerge. Many
other scenarios, such as the intelligent virtual assistant planning the route to
work example in the Introduction, might be represented using other social
dilemmas such as coordination or snowdrift games (Santos et al., 2006; Sig-
mund, 2010). Considering such games where it is easier for cooperation to
emerge has the potential to open new windows of opportunity for long-term
trust-based relationships to be established. Our future work will study how
trust-based strategies (as we have modelled) evolve in the context of other
social dilemmas.
5. Conclusion
We have demonstrated in this paper that evolutionary game theory pro-
vides a valuable framework to study trust. Social interactions often result
in complex dynamics with unexpected consequences, which a quantitative
model is able to shed light on. Our model provides formal support for the
theory that trust is a cognitive shortcut which people use to reduce the com-
plexity of their interactions. The results of the model provide new insights
into the questions of whether and when humans might trust intelligent ma-
chines, generating reasonable behavioural hypotheses that empirical studies
can test.
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Figure 6: Left: Frequency of strategies as a function of the opportunity cost
. Right: Frequency of cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based
strategies TUC and TUD, as a function of the opportunity cost . The difference
in frequency of cooperation between the two scenario is shaded in green when positive and
red when negative. Each results are presented for different trust threshold θ = 5 and
θ = 10. Parameters: β = 0.1, population size N = 100, γ = 1, r = 50, p = 0.25,
R = 1, S = −1, T = 2, P = 0.
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Appendix A: Results for different trust threshold θ
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Figure 7: Top: Frequency of strategies as a function of the number of rounds
r and importance of the game γ (logarithmic scale); Bottom: Frequency of
cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based strategies TUC and TUD, as
a function of the number of rounds r and importance of the game γ (logarithmic
scale). For clarity, the difference in frequency of cooperation is shaded in green when
positive and red when negative. Each results are presented for different trust threshold
θ = 5 and θ = 10. Parameters: β = 0.1, population size N = 100, p = 0.25, R = 1, S =
−1, T = 2, P = 0.
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Figure 8: Top: Frequency of strategies as a function of the opportunity cost 
and trustfulness 1/p (average number of rounds between checking event). Bot-
tom: Frequency of cooperation in absence or presence of trust-based strategies
TUC and TUD, as a function of the opportunity cost  and trustfulness 1/p
(average number of rounds between checking event). For clarity, the difference in
frequency of cooperation is shaded in green when positive and red when negative. Each
results are presented for different trust threshold θ = 5 and θ = 10. Parameters: β = 0.1,
population size N = 100, γ = 1,r = 50, R = 1, S = −1, T = 2, P = 0.
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